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PENDING PROBLEMS.

BY THE HON. HANNIS TAYLOR, LATE UNITED STATES MINISTER
TO SPAIN.

ALL historical students know that, in order to sweep away the endless misconceptions that arose out of the ancient method of studying history, the entire field has been re-explored. The result has been that all historical writings prior in date to the end of the eighteenth century, with the single exception, perhaps, of Gibbon, have been superseded by the works of the new or sociological school, whose primary purpose is to investigate in a purely scientific spirit the nature and constitution of societies, so as to discover the special laws that regulate their growth and decay, in the same general way in which biologists deal with the growth and decline of vegetable and animal life. To students of the new school, every society is a growing or a dying organism, and, as such, an aggregation of forces that can be subjected to clear and definite analysis. In that way the constitution of all the more important states—ancient and modern—have been traced to their roots, and the results embodied in that branch of knowledge known as comparative politics.

Thus, with the aid of the new historical method, the attempt has been made, first, to investigate the special histories and internal constitutions of all the more important social aggregates called nations; second, to compare them with each other in order to establish the points of likeness and unlikeness, as well as their relative weight and importance in the world considered as a whole. Race, language, religion, law, have thus become the leading factors in the mighty problem now confronting practical statesmen, who are standing to-day face to face with the momentous changes brought about by the silent and irresistible law of growth and decay that is ever disturbing the equilibrium of nations.

The fundamental biological principle that growth is a necessary consequence of life, without which life cannot exist, applies as well to nations as to animals and plants; and growth necessarily means conflict the moment that touching boundaries tempt the strong to displace the weak. In that way the special circumstances, incidents or accidents that precipitate conflicts between nations, must ever vary, while the natural laws that underlie them are changeless and immutable. Few will be found to dispute the fact that these irresistible laws are ever moving the nations on, according to a definite plan to which all must bow, even the Napoleons and the Bismarcks, the estimates of whose greatness must at last depend upon the extent of their "coöperation with the real tendency of the world" about them in their time. We have Motley's authority for the statement that "Bismarck said he used, when younger, to think himself a clever fellow enough, but now he was convinced that nobody had any control over events—that nobody was really powerful or great, and it made him laugh when he heard himself complimented as wise, foreseeing and exercising great influence over the world." If it be true, then, that the destiny of every nation, in the larger sense of the term, is moulded by the operation of irresistible natural laws working from within and without, and above our comprehension or control, the duty of the statesman who guides at the critical moment should be, like that of the midwife, to coöperate with nature in such a way as to free each new process of parturition from all unnecessary obstruction.

In the hope of minimizing the disturbances continually arising out of the growing powers of one set of states and the declining powers of another, the European nations closed the Thirty Years' War in 1648 with the famous Treaty of Westphalia, whose fundamental principles survived as the basis of the public law of Europe down to the French Revolution. The dream which that compact embodied was the maintenance of peace upon the basis of a balance of power, a system that contemplated the restraining of any European state, by force, if necessary, from "pursuing plans of acquisition, or making preparations looking toward future acquisitions, which are judged to be hazardous to the independence and national existence of its neighbors." No attempt was made to extend the system beyond the borders of European states, including Turkey. It was intended to apply rather to land power

than to sea power, and in that way acquisitions made over sea and outside of Europe were not considered within the scope of the concert.

When the epoch-making treaty was entered into, the leading European nations were divided, as they are now, into three groups, the Romance, the Teutonic and the Slavonic, which stood to each other in a very different relation to that in which they appear at the present time. At the outset, the states that dominated the new system of balance were France, Austria, Spain, Sweden and Holland. Great Britain, which stood in a position of comparative isolation, had just begun to widen her destiny by inaugurating a system of colonization; the new empire of Russia had not yet been lifted into great importance by the genius of Peter and Catherine; and Prussia had not yet been advanced from a secondary position in the German Empire to that of an independent kingdom by the military achievements of Frederick II. Among the powers then dominant the most ambitious was France, whose struggle for supremacy with Austria, involving chiefly dynastic questions, disturbed the balance of power in Europe down to the end of the eighteenth century. In order to illustrate the relative influence of France, Great Britain and Russia at the time the Treaty of Westphalia was signed, the statement may be made upon competent authority that, not long thereafter, those who spoke French numbered twenty millions, while those who spoke Russian numbered about fifteen millions, and those who spoke English, including all who had gone to the colonies in America, only about eight millions and a half. What has since disturbed the equilibrium of the world has been the declining influence of the Romance nations and the rapid expansion of the Slavs, on the one hand, and the Teutonic nations, on the other, especially those bound up in the British Empire, and in the United States of America.

The theory upon which the transatlantic acquisitions of the nations that entered into the European concert were to be excluded from its operation, was that their influence would react upon home affairs only in a remote and indirect way. But, in the hope of avoiding conflicting settlements, it was agreed "that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European governments, which title may be consummated by possession." Upon

that understanding, the maritime nations entered upon a career of conquest and settlement in the Western Hemisphere, the final outcome of which has been the creation of a new world-power, whose expansion has suddenly precipitated events that now promise to bring about a re-arrangement of international forces on a new basis. At the outset, France and Spain distanced England in the competition for the heart of the New World. The results of the first period of struggle may be summed up in the assertion that, while Spain succeeded in securing a footing upon its southern, and France upon its northern border, every attempt made by Englishmen at settlement in America, during the sixteenth century, ended before its close in failure and disappointment. The French, who early in the seventeenth century had possessed themselves of Canada and the St. Lawrence, possessed themselves early in the eighteenth of the Mississippi, and between the mouths of the two mighty rivers were placed, at points of the greatest strategic value, a line of forts, designed to protect from English intrusion that vast domain called New France, which stretched on the west of the Alleghanies from New Orleans to Quebec. While France was thus hemming in the English settlements between the Appalachian range and the Atlantic Ocean, Spain and Portugal were appropriating to themselves what remained of the three Americas. How far that process had advanced up to January, 1800, will clearly appear from the following table,* showing in square miles the relative portions of the New World possessed by each nation at that time:

			per cent.
Spain.....	7,028,628	or	45.7
Great Britain.....	3,719,109	"	24.2
Portugal.....	3,209,878	"	20.9
United States.....	827,844	"	5.4
Russia.....	577,390	"	3.8
France.....	29,352	"	.01
Netherlands.....	434	"	.0
Denmark.....	223	"	.0
Total three Americas.....	15,392,858		100

France's position on this balance sheet, indicated by the figures .01, was the result of the first great effort at expansion made by the American colonies, under the lead of the mother country, when the time came for them to pass the tops of the Alleghanies, in order to make place for their swelling populations in the valleys of the Ohio and Mississippi, upon which France had

* See *Review of Reviews*, Dec., 1897, p. 715.

first laid hold. When the conflict came, when the English colonial system, trained in self reliance, came into collision with the French colonial system, enervated by paternalism, but one result was possible. France's dream of empire in the West was broken; she was forced to give up her priceless possessions, and to retire from North America.

The great Western territory of which France was thus deprived Maryland claimed should be vested not in a few great states, but in the confederacy first formed; and thus it came to pass that the area of the United States, as recognized by the treaty of 1783, exceeded 800,000 square miles, with the Mississippi as its western boundary. And yet, even with that vast addition to the territory of the original thirteen colonies, the single republic that existed in America in 1800 only occupied 5 per cent. of its total area. How that small proportion has expanded since that time is a matter of familiar history. In 1803 Jefferson, availing himself of the necessities of Napoleon, consummated the Louisiana Purchase, whereby the national domain was more than doubled by the acquisition of an area estimated at 1,124,685 square miles. The natural supplement to that transaction, which placed us among the great powers of the world, was the treaty negotiated with Spain in 1819, whereby the whole of Florida was ceded to us in consideration of a concession upon our part that yielded Texas to Mexico. In 1845, however, we annexed Texas and added 376,133 square miles to our domain, despite Mr. Clay's anxiety lest we should be looked upon "as actuated by a spirit of rapacity and an inordinate desire for territorial aggrandizement." Mexico's turn then came, and in 1848 the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed, under which New Mexico, including what is now Arizona and California, came to us for fifteen millions. For ten millions more we consummated the Gadsden Purchase in 1853; and through the two acquisitions we received an addition of 591,398 square miles. In 1867, we purchased Alaska from Russia, and in that way added 531,409 square miles of territory, not contiguous to our own, with a coast line longer than that upon our Atlantic and Gulf seaboard combined. In that way, our national domain has been so expanded during the century as to include now 3,602,990 square miles.

While the growth of our Federal republic was thus bringing about the expulsion of the Romance nations from the heart of

North America, through the direct means of conquest and purchase, the same force was at the same time expelling them from Central and South America through the indirect means of its moral influence. The great political idea which the English settlers brought with them to the New World reappeared in the form of a self-governing republican state, whose internal organization rests upon the basis of English law, and whose ethical ideals rest upon the same basis. Under new geographical conditions, the typical English state in America soon learned how to unite with others of its class in a Federal system capable of unlimited expansion. That new political conception has impressed itself upon the constitution of Canada, without, however, depriving the British Empire of any territory held by it in 1800. In Central and South America its history has been far otherwise. There, early in the present century, mainly during the period between 1810 and 1825, eighteen republics after the American model were born upon the soil of Spain and Portugal. In that way, the area occupied in America by republican institutions has swelled from 827,844 square miles (5.4 per cent.) in 1800, to 11,632,426 square miles (75.6 per cent.) at the present time. When to that grand total is added the 3,626,352 square miles still possessed by Great Britain in the three Americas, only 134,090 square miles (including Cuba and Porto Rico) are now governed outside of the sphere of the British and American political systems, which, despite local variations, rest upon a single broad and historic basis. In the light of these facts, no student trained in the historical school can doubt that the paternal and dependent pro-consular system of colonization established by the Romance nations in the New World has broken down and disappeared in the presence of the self-reliant and self-governing English system, in obedience to that irresistible and all-pervading natural law which provides that the fittest shall survive. The process which began with the expulsion of France from North America in 1763, ended with the expulsion of Spain from Cuba and Porto Rico during the current year. The special circumstances or accidents that finally precipitated the conflict between Spain and the United States are, from a historical point of view, of no special importance, beyond the fact that they fixed the exact point of time for the termination of a process whose result was as certain as anything can be that follows the course of nature.

No successful attempt can be made to master the grave and far-reaching questions of national and international policy that have been suddenly put before us through the results of the recent war, without a clear comprehension of the fact that that war was the inevitable outcome of our national development, which has drawn after it, as a necessary consequence, a vast and rapid territorial expansion. The empirics who imagine that it is within the power of political parties, or of individual statesmen, to check that expansion arbitrarily, are as vain as the king who commanded the waves to pause at his feet. As a tree or a vine may be trained to grow in a certain direction, so we may hope, by political means, to direct or to restrain to a certain extent, perhaps, the national tendency. But, in order to accomplish even that much, we must clearly comprehend existing conditions, and deal with pending questions in the light of those conditions. The founders of the republic, with Washington at their head, followed that simple and obvious rule a century ago, when the then infant republic, with its three millions of inhabitants and its 800,000 square miles of territory, stood to the European world in a state of isolation. They did not attempt to look a century ahead of them, in order to lay down rules for the guidance of statesmen who were to be called upon to deal with conditions of which they had but the faintest dream.

In obedience to his practical temper, Washington, in his farewell address of 1796, wisely and prudently defined a foreign policy suited to that time, whose keynote was that: "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. * * * It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portions of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it." Washington, of course, had specially in view the confusion resulting from the dynastic struggles that had disturbed the European concert in his time, extending often even to our shores; and he was, therefore, naturally desirous that we should not "entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor or caprice." There is no reason, however, to charge Washington, upon the basis of that declaration, with the Utopian dream that the qualified isolation, which he recommended to one of the weakest of nations, should continue after that nation had become one of the strongest.

The ablest of Washington's contemporaries who were called upon, twenty-seven years later, to re-define, in a more specific form, what our relations to the European powers should be, certainly indulged in no such illusion. In 1815, the five great powers entered into the league known as the Holy Alliance, which was afterward declared to be "a union for the reconquest and liberation of a great portion of the continent of Europe from the military despotism of France. * * * It was never, however, intended for the government of the world, or for the superintendence of the internal affairs of other states." That last qualification was, in the course of time, entirely abandoned. The allies so far assumed the right of intervening in the internal affairs of particular states, as to declare in a secret treaty their purpose "to put an end to the system of representative governments" in Europe, and to adopt measures to destroy "the liberty of the press." In the execution of that policy, which also assumed "to repel the maxim of rebellion, in whatever place and under whatever form it might show itself," the popular movements in Italy were crushed, and, in April, 1823, France undertook, in the name of the allies, to invade Spain for the purpose of restoring the absolute monarch, Ferdinand VII., to the throne. Such was the prelude to the declaration made to the British government, before the summer was over, that the allies proposed to call a Congress for the purpose of overturning the revolutionary governments in South America, which the United States had recognized, and of setting up anew within their limits the discarded sovereignty of Spain. By that time, Castlereagh, who had always been favorable to the alliance, had been superseded by Canning, who resolved, in obedience to popular sentiment in England, to suggest to Mr. Rush, our minister at London, that the British Government would stand by us if we desired to resist the attempt of the allies to overthrow the Spanish-American governments, in whose fate we were so deeply interested. Great Britain had not yet recognized those governments, but her mercantile interests in them were hostile to their re-subjection to the yoke of Spain's restrictive colonial system.

When Canning's suggestion was communicated to President Monroe, he lost no time in submitting the matter for advice to the ex-Presidents, Madison and Jefferson, both of whom viewed the substance of it with favor. Jefferson went to the heart of the

whole matter, when he replied: "Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. * * * While the last (Europe) is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation (Great Britain), most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a continent at a stroke. * * * Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one or all on earth, and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her, then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship, and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more side by side in the same cause"—a sentiment lately reiterated with great force by Mr. Chamberlain.

Mr. Jefferson certainly had no prejudice against an alliance with Great Britain, even if it should lead to a joint war against the rest of Europe.

After he had been duly advised, President Monroe made the memorable declaration contained in his message of Dec. 2, 1823; and that, coupled with the declaration made by Canning to the French Ambassador on the 9th of the preceding October, resulted in completely frustrating the design of the allies to re-establish the sovereignty of Spain over the South American republics.

Only with slow and timid steps have American statesmen advanced to a full and clear comprehension of the real meaning of this momentous transaction, which had to be interpreted in the light of our after history. Professor Lawrence, in his "International Law," dimly indicated the result of Mr. Monroe's declaration when he said: "the position of the United States on the American continent is in some respects like, and in others exceedingly unlike, that which is accorded in Europe to the six great powers. * * * If it be true that there is a primacy in America, comparable to that which exists in Europe, it must be wielded by her, and by her alone." Ever since the making of the Treaty of Westphalia, the European concert has claimed and exercised the right of intervention in the affairs of any particu-

lar state or states, whenever the maintenance of the balance of power has seemed to require it. As the sole power capable of exercising that kind of an overlordship in the affairs of the New World, the United States has, in two recent cases, so asserted its right of intervention as to put it at last upon a clear and definite foundation. In the Anglo-Venezuelan controversy, President Cleveland firmly and wisely declared our right to assume jurisdiction over a controversy as to boundaries between a European state and an American state, and to enforce our award against one or both, by force of arms, if necessary. The calm and just spirit in which Great Britain accepted this assertion of our right of intervention did credit to her statesmanship, and laid the foundation for the present good understanding which her then graceful concession made possible. When our interference in the affairs of Cuba could no longer be avoided, President McKinley wisely and consistently invoked, in the same way, our right of intervention, and applied it to that case in the form in which the facts warranted. Our collision with Spain in 1898 was, indeed, in one aspect of it, simply a rehearsal of the transaction of 1823.

All who are familiar with the diplomatic history of our recent war with Spain, know very well that, as the time for the conflict approached, the house of Austria, interested as of old in the Spanish succession, made a vigorous attempt to revive the Holy Alliance, by drawing the European powers into a concert that was expected to dictate to us just what we could and could not do in Cuban affairs. How the first carefully matured effort in that direction was detected and frustrated at the critical moment, it is not for me to discuss at the present time; but all the world knows that, when the scheme was renewed, it was at last finally broken down by Great Britain's unmistakable intimation that, if such a Continental combination should be formed, she would stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States. There never was a more remarkable case of history repeating itself. Without the help of Great Britain in 1823, the designs of the Holy Alliance in South America could never have been shattered; without the help of the same power in 1898, the designs of another incipient Holy Alliance could not have been frustrated. It is hardly necessary to suggest that, without England at our side, we would have been powerless in Cuban waters, in the presence of the combined fleets of Continental Europe.

In the light of recent events, we should therefore be able to settle the two gravest questions involving the future of our foreign relations. First, there should be no further controversy as to our right of intervention in the affairs of this hemisphere, since it has been frankly and fully admitted by the greatest of the European powers, and the only one who now possesses any considerable portion of the soil of the New World. Second, we should no longer hesitate to accept the advice given by Mr. Jefferson in 1823 to "sedulously cherish a cordial friendship" with Great Britain, as "the nation which can do us the most harm of any or all on earth, and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world." Wise men on both sides of the Atlantic seem to agree that the desired end will be attained if the two great branches of the English people bind themselves together in what is generally termed a moral alliance. As Mr. Dicey has happily expressed it: "We are aware that at this moment England and America, if allied, or even if on terms of equal friendship, without actual alliance, can control the course of the world's history. Together we may be masters of the sea; and to have control of the sea means absolute security against foreign attack." With an international tribunal of arbitration established between Great Britain and the United States, there would be but little danger of an actual rupture between the two nations.

With England firmly by our side, there is no reason why we should not deal wisely and without pressure with the grave problems now pending for solution in the Atlantic and Pacific. As we have followed the political experience of the mother country in everything else, there is no reason why we should not learn from her how to build up and manage a colonial empire, if destiny has decreed that we shall have one. In that domain Great Britain has been eminently successful, because she has been wise enough to devise an elastic system of colonial government, which she adapts to each new acquisition according to its special stage of development and its local wants and traditions. In that way her colonies represent almost every form of government, from that of the autocratic High Commissioner, who legislates for savage Basutoland by the issuance of proclamations merely, up to the complex Federal union under which the self-governing communities of Canada control their destiny, with scarcely any interference from the parent state. Great Britain does not pretend to extend the

full rights of British citizenship to all of her colonists. The right of self-government is limited to colonies in the temperate zone—in India and the crown colonies the constitutional doctrines that secure the right of public meeting and the freedom of the press do not exist. The question is, whether under our less flexible Constitution we can govern colonies effectively without running the risk incident to the admission of distant and alien peoples to full citizenship.

There are but two conditions under which we can govern new territory prior to its admission as a State. When such territory happens to be conquered and a purely military occupation is established, the limits of the Union are not thereby enlarged. Not until a treaty of peace has confirmed the right does the new territory become a part of the national domain to which it is then annexed. During this first or military stage, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, can provide for the security of persons and property, and for the orderly administration of justice, through a military government, which may either set aside pre-existing laws or continue their enforcement, subject to all necessary modifications. No crown colony of the British Empire possesses a more complete form of government than the President of the United States can organize as Commander-in-Chief. Second, when the territory annexed has passed under the jurisdiction of Congress, that body can govern it either through laws operating directly upon it, or through a territorial government expressly created for it. Excepting only the right of representation in Congress, there is no substantial right of local self-government that such a community does not enjoy. There is, therefore, really no good reason to doubt that all pending problems may be solved through the constitutional means at our command.

Whenever the question is asked, "What is to be done with Cuba?" the answer comes that the whole matter was settled in advance by the declaration made by Congress when the war began, that the contest would be carried on with no other motive than to secure the complete political independence of the island from Spanish dominion. When that assurance was given, the best friends of Cuba in the United States, the writer included, honestly believed that the Cuban republic was a reality, an organized and self-sustaining force that would be able to guarantee peace, order and law when the sovereignty of Spain should be over-

thrown. No good can now come of clinging to illusions, for everybody knows that, as the war progressed, the truth was disclosed that the moral and physical power of the Cuban republic rested only upon the battered fragment of a patriot army, wasted by hunger and disease, which has no adequate power to grapple with the task of pacification, even if that task were thrust upon it.

To recognize immediately the complete independence of Cuba the moment the evacuation by the Spaniards is completed, would certainly result in remanding the unhappy isle to a state of confusion almost as great as that from which it has emerged. If the promise given by Congress ever contemplated such a thing, it now appears to have been improvident. As Mr. James Bryce, England's scholar-statesman, has lately expressed it: "Declarations honestly made sometimes turn out, through intervening events and altered conditions, very hard to put in force." And yet, no matter how difficult it may be to put our promise to the Cuban people and to the world in force, it must be performed. Only the time and manner of its performance remain absolutely within our control. Our own repose, no less than that of the Cuban people, peremptorily demand that the reign of peace and law shall be so completely re-established throughout the island that agriculture and commerce may be revived, and the administration of justice re-established upon such a firm foundation that all property rights of natives and foreigners shall be secure. To bring about that state of things, something more will be necessary than a mere military *régime*, although such a *régime* may have to be employed for a time in order to hush discord, and in that way make possible the establishment of a settled system of territorial government. When such a system is established its administration should be committed to a set of officials far superior in character and capacity to those to whom our territories are generally assigned. Only through the maintenance of a liberal *régime*, political and commercial, that will promote the general welfare of the island, as well as our own, can we convince the Cuban people that their true interests lie in a closer relation with the one country without which they cannot exist. Industrially, Cuba is a great sugar estate, and that product, which represents eight-tenths of the exports, can now be sold only in the ports of the United States. If we shall encourage and develop the growth of Cuban industry and commerce, and maintain a firm and liberal

system of law and order, the immediate consequence will be a very large immigration into Cuba from the United States. Only by a peaceful conquest of that kind can we ever hope to make of the island a permanent and stable element in our national life. That process should be permitted to work itself out fully under a territorial system, before the Cuban people shall be called upon to pass finally upon the momentous question whether they will enter into the Union as a state, or attempt to set up an independent nation, with all the perils incident to such a venture. There is no good reason to believe that there is any radical difference of view between the leaders of the two great parties, so far as the disposition to be made of the West Indian Islands is concerned. The recent utterances of certain State Conventions make it plain that the Democratic party does not propose to diminish its prestige, or to weaken its influence, by failing to discharge its full duty to the nation with respect to Cuba and Porto Rico.

The disposition to be made of the Philippines involves a problem of a radically different character, as to whose solution Republicans and Democrats will differ, no doubt, for a long time to come. The most remarkable thing, perhaps, that has occurred in the course of our rapid expansion, has been the growth, within the last fifty years, of that part of our country that lies between the Mississippi River and the Pacific Ocean. When we remember that, as late as 1852, the only States west of the Mississippi were Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa and California—the last named representing only a string of mining camps centering in San Francisco, then a rough frontier town; that Oregon, Washington and British Columbia contained only a few scattered settlements and trading stations, with practically no exports but furs; that, as late as 1850, there were no telegraph lines and only eighty miles of railway in operation west of the Mississippi; that substantially all the shipping of the United States was then owned east of that river—it is hard to believe our eyes when we look upon the scene that confronts us to-day. And yet, startling as the transformation has been, all that has happened was clearly foreseen and foretold by a great American statesman, who was the first, perhaps, to comprehend clearly in his day the possibilities of the near future. As early as 1846, Mr. Seward, in a letter published under the title, "We Should Carry Out Our Des-

tiny," began to prophesy; and, in a speech, made in the Senate of the United States in 1852, upon the question of American commerce in the Pacific, he said: "The discovery of this continent and of those islands, and the organization upon their soil of societies and governments, have been great and important events. After all, they are merely preliminaries, a preparation by secondary incidents, in comparison with the sublime result which is about to be consummated—the junction of the two civilizations upon the coast and in the islands of the Pacific. * * * Henceforth, European commerce, European politics, European thought and European activity, although actually gaining force, and European connections, although actually becoming more intimate, will nevertheless, relatively sink in importance; while the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands and the vast region beyond, will become the chief theatre of events in the world's great hereafter."

We have not only annexed the Hawaiian Republic and laid violent hands upon a part of the Philippines, but we have so extended our commercial relations beyond the Pacific that it appears that, "as respects number of residents and volume of trade, the United States has larger interests in China than any European power save England," and economists are seriously discussing our prospects for securing a part of the trade of Manchuria, now rapidly developing under Russian influence. Thus, in a commercial way, we have only become deeply concerned in the fate of the ancient empire about to be partitioned between England, Russia France and Germany. We may not desire a single foot of Chinese territory, but we are deeply interested in the maintenance of our treaty rights, through which equality of trading privileges is secured to us. Thus it clearly appears that Mr. Seward's dream has suddenly ripened into reality; we are now not only in the islands of the Pacific, but far beyond, dividing the commerce of China with the European nations. A certain part of our population, who might be called Tories, deem it their duty to fly into a passion and then hurl the epithet of "jingo" at any man who dares to open his eyes and admit what he actually sees before him. Another and more reasonable class deem it their duty to recognize existing conditions, and to deal with them in the same practical way in which we have disposed of like questions in the past. The only matter really at issue at the present moment is that involving the disposition to be made of the Philippines,

provided we shall acquire the right to deal with them at all through the award of a joint Commission in which Spain has an equal voice. To the arbitrament of such a Commission, the President has submitted the fate of the Philippines under the terms of the protocol; so, no matter what claim the five American Commissioners may make, it can be promptly vetoed by their five Spanish associates. We can hardly hope even for the cession of the whole of the island of Luzon, except upon the payment of a certain compensation. If a treaty embodying such a proposal shall reach the Senate, what will be the voice of the nation? It seems more than probable that a majority of the Republican leaders, with the President at their head, will claim that the procession must not pause; that we must at once possess the Philippines, either through the payment of some indemnity to Spain, or through a fresh appeal to the arbitrament of arms. On the other hand, it does not seem likely that a majority of the Democratic leaders can be brought to accept either alternative. Impressed as they may be with the historical fact that destiny has already irrevocably involved us with the affairs of the Pacific world, whose growing greatness can no longer be questioned, they will likely deem it prudent to accept Mr. Seward's advice, "to hasten nothing, to take time to digest one territory before swallowing another."

While Cuba and Porto Rico are passing through the process of digestion, we should prepare ourselves for the inevitable by cutting the Nicaraguan Canal and by developing the strength of our navy.

HANNIS TAYLOR.